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Abstract
Cooperators forgo their interest to benefit others. Thus cooperation should not be favored by natural
selection. It challenges the evolutionists, since cooperation is widespread. As one of the resolutions,
information spreading has been revealed to play a key role in the emergence of cooperation. Individuals,
however, are typically assumed to be passive in the information spreading. Here we assume that indi-
viduals are active to spread the information via self-recommendation. Individuals with higher intensities
of self-recommendation are likely to have more neighbors. We find that i) eloquent cooperators are nec-
essary to promote cooperation; ii) individuals need to be open to the self-recommendation to enhance
cooperation level; iii) the cost-to-benefit ratio should be smaller than one minus the ratio between self-
recommendation intensities of defector and cooperator, which qualitatively measures the viscosity of the
population. Our results highlight the importance of active information spreading on cooperation.
1 Introduction
Cooperators forgo their interest to benefit others. Thus it cannot be favored by natural selection without
additional mechanisms. Cooperation, however, is ubiquitous ranging from genes to multicellularities in
biology. In addition, human society is based upon cooperation as well. It has taken decades to fill the
gap between evolutionary theory and widespread cooperation [1, 2, 3, 4]. Evolutionary game theory takes
natural selection into account as the driving force of evolution. It provides a convenient paradigm to study
the evolution of cooperation [5, 6]. In particular, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) has been extensively adopted
as a metaphor to study the emergence of cooperation [7, 8, 9, 10]. In the simplified PD game, a cooperator
offers its opponent a benefit b at a personal cost of c (b > c > 0), whereas a defector offers nothing. As a
result, it is best to defect irrespective of the co-player’s decision. In addition, it is shown that defection is
the only evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) [11, 12] of the PD game with the replicator equation [13] which
describes the dynamics of cooperation level in the well-mixed population. Cooperation cannot be achieved
even though mutual cooperation is the best for the group interest because all individuals try to maximize
their own interest. As thus, the PD game captures the conflict between group and individual interests so
called social dilemma.
To resolve this social dilemma, many mechanisms have been proposed, and one of the key factors is
information. Information plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation. The decision making
processes are based on a variety of information, such as the historical behaviors and payoffs of partners
[14]. For example, individuals with imitation rule not only make use of the information of their own payoffs,
but also take the opponents’ payoffs into account when making decisions [15, 16, 17]. On the contrary,
individuals with aspiration rule only make use of the information of their own payoffs to make decisions.
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Due to this difference, a strategy favored by imitation rule can be disfavored by aspiration-based rule [18, 19].
Thus, it is of importance what information individuals possess in decision making. Once the information is
available, it owes to the process of information transmission and acquisition to determine who obtains the
true information. This process is highly complex in the real world, and it is still unclear how the processes
of information transmission and acquisition reshape the evolutionary dynamics. To examine the effect of
active information spreading on the emergence of cooperation, we focus on self-recommendation, i.e., a self-
promoting action to attract others. On the one hand, commercial advertisement is of self-recommendation
in human society [20]. Enterprises make advertisements on the mass media including TV, newspapers and
internet to recommend their products to potential consumers. In the animal world, courtship display is
also of self-recommendation, that animals attract mates by showing off their beauty or strength [21, 22].
For example, peacocks spread their beautiful tails to attract peahens [23]. Individuals self-recommending
themselves are essentially active to deliver information and draw attention from others in both animal worlds
and human societies. Thus self-recommendation is a widespread active way to spread information. On the
other hand, it can pave the way for individuals to figure out who the cooperator is via self-recommendation.
Surely it can be even more difficult to figure out who the cooperator is, if exaggerated or even false advertising
is present. For example, the products or services can be not as good as stated in advertisements, and
consumers can be cheated via the self-recommendation. Thus, it is of great importance how individuals
respond to the self-recommendation.
To this end, we take the self-recommendation as the way of information transmission. We assume
that individuals can react to the self-recommendation or not as the way of information acquisition. To
be more precise, we assume that both cooperators and defectors are able to recommend themselves when
an individual decides to have a new neighbor. Their capabilities of self-recommendation are characterized
by self-recommendation intensities. The larger the self-recommendation intensity is, the more eloquent
the individual is, and the more likely it is connected. On the other hand, we introduce stubbornness to
capture how convincible an individual is. The individual with larger stubbornness value is less likely to
accept the self-recommendation. Our results show that cooperation is more likely to prevail, provided that i)
cooperators are more eloquent than defectors; and that ii) individuals who are making decision to alter social
partners are more convincible. The results show that the self-recommendation reshapes the evolutionary fate
of cooperation.
2 Model
We consider a structured population ofN individuals. Initially the population is located on a regular network,
in which nodes represent individuals and links represent social ties between individuals. We assume that the
population size N is much larger than the average degree 〈d〉 of the network (N  〈d〉). In other words,
each individual’s neighborhood has a limited size. Each individual is either a cooperator (C, denoted by a
unit vector s = [1, 0]T ) or a defector (D, s = [0, 1]T ). The payoff matrix Q is given by
C D
C
D
(
b− c −c
b 0
)
,
(1)
where b > c > 0, and c/b is the cost-to-benefit ratio.
At each time step, either the strategy of an individual or the structure of the network is updated [24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29]. Let ω be the probability of strategy update, then 1 − ω corresponds to the probability of
network update. The probability ω captures the relative time scales of the two processes.
Strategy update . We adopt the Fermi updating rule [15, 30]. At each step of strategy update, a
focal individual F is randomly selected from the population, and its accumulated payoff is calculated as
ΦF =
∑
i∈∆F s
T
FQsi, where ∆F represents the neighborhood of individual F , and Q is the payoff matrix.
The strategies of individuals F and i are represented by sF and si, respectively. Then another individual
G is randomly selected among the neighborhood of F . The accumulated payoff of G is given by ΦG =∑
i∈∆G s
T
GQsi. The focal individual F compares its accumulated payoff ΦF with ΦG and switches to the
strategy ofG with probability (1 + exp [−β (ΦG − ΦF )])−1. Non-negative β controls the intensity of selection,
which corresponds to an inverse temperature in statistical physics [30]. Small β implies weak selection. In this
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case, individuals imitate other’s strategies with probability approximately one-half, even when the opponent
gains much more than the focal individual. In particular, zero selection intensity corresponds to the neutral
drift [31]. Large β means strong selection. In this case, individual F is almost sure to adopt the strategy of
individual G, provided individual G gains even slightly more than individual F . The infinite large selection
intensity mirrors the perfect rationality in economics [32].
Network update . At each step of network update, a link is randomly selected from the network and
the link breaks off with probability k. If it is broken, an individual between the two endpoints of the link is
picked randomly as an active individual. The active individual is to reform a new link, i.e. rewire to a new
individual who is not in its current neighborhood. On the one hand, we assume that all the individuals in
the population are informed that the active individual is searching for a new partner. And all the qualified
potential neighbors, who are not in the active individual’s neighborhood, recommend themselves to the
active individual based on their intensities of recommendation. For simplicity, we assume positive constants
RC and RD to capture the intensities of self-recommendation for cooperators and defectors, respectively.
On the other hand, we also assume the stubbornness p of an active individual. With probability p, the
active individual does not take account of others’ self-recommendation [33]. In this case, a new neighbor is
randomly chosen regardless of self-recommendation. Otherwise, the active individual does respond to the
self-recommendation with probability 1−p. The active individual rewires to an individual with a probability
proportional to its intensity of self-recommendation. Consequently, the active individual is likely to be
attracted by eloquent individuals, those with large intensities of recommendation.
The network update captures the process of information transmission and its acquisition. For the in-
formation transmission, self-recommendation is adopted. Individuals compete for social ties, as the Moran
process does [34]. The intensity of the self-recommendation mirrors the fitness of an individual, and links
mirror the off-springs. Individuals with higher self-recommendation intensities have larger likelihood to be-
come the new neighbor of the active individual, as individuals with larger fitness are more likely to produce
offsprings. Furthermore, the total number of links keeps constant over time, as the population size keeps
invariant in the Moran process. For the information acquisition, we assume a react-or-non-react model. The
probability to react to the self-recommendation mirrors the selection strength in the Moran process: Individ-
uals with high probabilities of reacting to the self-recommendation is likely to connect with individuals with
strong intensities of self-recommendation, as individuals with large fitness are very likely to reproduce only if
the selection intensity is strong in the Moran process. Therefore, the network update is also an evolutionary
process.
3 Analysis
In this section, we make use of mean-field analysis to show how cooperative behavior is reshaped by the self-
recommendation, which drives the topology to evolve. Noteworthy, both the strategy and network structure
evolve. It gives rise to a coupled dynamics, which is typically challenging to solve [35]. We overcome this by
assuming ω  1, i.e. the network update is much more frequent than the strategy update (see A). Thus, the
network structure keeps evolving, and reaches its stationary regime before individuals update their strategies.
In this case, the linking dynamics is captured by a Markov chain. The resulting stationary distribution of the
Markov chain ~pi0 quantitatively indicates the fraction of CC, CD and DD links of the network, respectively.
The stationary distribution is given by
~pi0 = (pi01, pi02, pi03) = χ
−1(γ3γ4, γ1γ4, γ1γ2), (2)
where
γ1 = pkxD(xCRC + xDRD) + (1− p)kxDRD,
γ2 =
1
2
kxDp(xCRC + xDRD) +
1
2
(1− p)kxDRD,
γ3 =
1
2
kxCp(xCRC + xDRD) +
1
2
(1− p)kxCRC ,
γ4 = pkxC(xCRC + xDRD) + (1− p)kxCRC ,
(3)
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and χ = (γ3γ4 + γ1γ4 + γ1γ2) is the normalization factor (see A).
If the active individuals are stubborn, i.e. p = 1, the stationary distribution becomes (x2C , 2xCxD, x
2
D).
This is the same as that in the well-mixed population. If the active individuals are not stubborn at all,
i.e., p = 0, the stationary distribution ~pi0 is given by (α2C , 2αCαD, α
2
D) with αs = Rsxs(RCxC + RDxD)
−1,
s ∈ {C,D}. It implies that the self-recommendation reshapes the population structure. It acts as if the
well-mixed population with a rescaled frequency of cooperators, i.e. from xC to αC . To be precise, it implies
that i) pi01 is a monotonically increasing function of RC/RD, that is, the fraction of CC links increases with
RC/RD; ii) pi03 is a monotonically decreasing function of RC/RD, and the fraction of DD links decreases
with RC/RD; iii) pi02, i.e., the fraction of CD links increases at first and then decrease with RC/RD. Note
that there are few CD links, provided RC/RD is large enough.
The stationary regime of the network structure facilitates us to estimate the average accumulated payoff
of both cooperators and defectors. If we additionally assume that the population size is sufficiently large,
we find that the fraction of cooperation is approximately captured by
x˙C = xC(1− xC) [(RC −RD)((1− p)b− c)xC −RDc] , (4)
which can be found in B.
Noteworthy, Eq. (4) is equivalent to the replicator dynamics x˙C = xC(1 − xC)(f˜C − f˜D) [13], in which
f˜C and f˜D are determined by the transformed payoff matrix Q˜
C D
C
D
(
RC(1− p)(b− c) −RDc
RD(1− p)b+RCpc 0
)
.
(5)
In other words, self-recommendation essentially changes the interaction between cooperators and defectors
[2]. The transformed payoff matrix Eq. (5) captures the interaction between cooperators and defectors shifted
by self-recommendation.
4 Results
In this section, we make use of the replicator equation with the transformed game Eq. (5) to investigate
how self-recommendation intensities (RC and RD) and stubbornness (p) affect the evolutionary dynamics of
cooperation. Besides, we also investigate the robustness of the results with respect to the parameters which
are absent in the transformed game Eq. (5) via simulations.
4.1 More eloquent cooperators and less stubborn individuals promote cooper-
ation
We resort to the transformed matrix Eq. (5) to shed light on the evolutionary fate of cooperation. If the
opponent is a defector, then the effective payoff of a defector, i.e., 0, must be greater than that of a cooperator,
i.e., −RDc < 0. If the opponent is a cooperator, a cooperator is better off than a defector if and only if
RC(1 − p)(b − c) > RD(1 − p)b + RCpc holds. In other words, cooperation is a strict Nash Equilibrium of
the transformed matrix, provided that both
RC > RD and p < 1− c
b
1
1− RDRC
(6)
hold, which is equivalent to the inequality RC(1−p)(b−c) > RD(1−p)b+RCpc. In this case, the transformed
matrix is a coordination game, in which individuals are better off to do what others do. Both x∗C = 1 and
x∗C = 0 are stable fixed points for Eq. (4), separated by the unstable internal fixed point
x∗C =
cRD
(RC −RD)((1− p)b− c) . (7)
Therefore, if Eq. (6) is fulfilled, cooperation dominates the population provided that the initial fraction of
cooperators exceeds the critical value x∗C by Eq. (7). Otherwise, defection takes over the population. The
critical value x∗C via simulation is in good agreement with the theoretical prediction (Fig 1).
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Figure 1: The final fraction of cooperators as a function of initial fraction of cooperators. The symbols
indicate the simulation results and the dashed lines represent the internal unstable fixed point x∗C given by
Eq. (7). The simulation results are in agreement with our theoretical predictions. If the initial value is small
than the critical fraction of cooperators x∗C , defection dominates the population. Otherwise, cooperation is
taking over the population. This mirrors a coordination game with cooperation a stable Nash equilibrium.
Each data point in this figure is averaged over 500 independent runs. In each run, we set a transient
time of 106 generations. (Parameters: Prisoner’s Dilemma with b = 3 and c = 1. The intensities of self-
recommendation of cooperators and defectors, RC = 3 and RD = 1 respectively. Population size N = 1000,
average degree 〈d〉 = 20, probability of a strategy update ω = 10−3, link-breaking probability k = 1, and
selection intensity β = 10.)
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Based on Eq. (6), two conditions are required to promote cooperation: i) the cooperators should be better
than defectors at self-recommendation, i.e., RC > RD; ii) individuals should be less stubborn and more open
to self-recommendation, i.e., p < 1− cb 1
1−RDRC
.
For i), it indicates that cooperation emerges only if cooperators are more eloquent than defectors. On
the one hand, if RC > RD cooperators are more active and are more likely to be selected as a new neighbor.
This would make cooperators clustered together. The clustered cooperators interact more often with each
other and gain higher payoffs. Thus they would outperform defector neighbors in payoff, and eventually
take over the population [24]. Noteworthy, eloquent cooperators are taking risks because they would attach
to defectors from time to time. However, the resulting clustered cooperators expand so quickly that the
risk is under control. On the other hand, let us consider the situation that RC > RD does not hold. We
focus on a special case RC = RD, i.e. cooperators and defectors are equally eloquent. In this case, all the
potential new neighbors of the active individual have the same likelihood to be selected. In other words,
there is no preferential attachment in the linking dynamics. The stationary population regime ends up with
pi0 = (x
2
C , 2xCxD, x
2
D), which is the same as that in the well-mixed population. The resulting replicator
equation is x˙C = −cxC(1 − xC), which is exactly the replicator dynamics of the original PD game. As a
result, defection dominates the population regardless of the stubbornness p. Therefore RC > RD is necessary
for the emergence of cooperation.
For ii), individuals should be open and less stubborn, i.e., p < 1− cb 1
1−RDRC
(see Fig. 2). To illustrate this,
let us consider two extreme cases: p = 1 and p = 0. When p = 1, i.e. the active individual is so stubborn that
it does not react to the self-recommendation by anybody. In this case, the active individual randomly chooses
new neighbors. The self-recommendation does not work. The resulting stationary population regime is the
same as that of the well-mixed population. Thus the approximated replicator equation is x˙C = −cxC(1−xC),
as that in the well-mixed population. Therefore, defection dominates the population. Let us resort to the
other extreme case p = 0, i.e. individuals are not stubborn at all, and take into account of the self-
recommendation. The transformed payoff matrix becomes(
RC(b− c) −RDc
RDb 0
)
. (8)
The transformed payoff matrix Eq. (8) shows that a) when a defector meets a defector, the effective payoff
of each defector is still 0 as in the original PD game Eq. (1); b) when a defector meets a cooperator, both
individuals obtains RD times the payoff of the original PD game; c) when a cooperator meets a cooperator,
each cooperator gets RC times the payoff of the original PD game. Noteworthy, the group interest of two
cooperators 2RC(b − c) outperforms that of a cooperator and a defector RD(b − c), provided 2RC > RD.
Thus cooperation could still be a social optimum as in the original PD game Eq. (1). For the emergence of
cooperation, it is essential to compare RC(b − c) and RDb. In the original PD game, b − c is less than b,
whereas RC(b− c) can be larger than RDb as long as RC is sufficiently larger than RD. To be precise, if
c
b
< 1− RD
RC
, (9)
cooperators take over the whole population as long as the initial fraction of cooperators exceed x∗C =
cRD/[(b − c)(RC − RD)]. The cost-to-benefit ratio c/b is smaller than 1, thus RC > RD is necessary if
Eq. (9) holds. Or cooperation prevails only if cooperators are much more eloquent than defectors (see
Fig. 3). For p between zero and one, the interaction between cooperators and defectors can be captured
by Eq. (5). As p increases, the effective game moves from Eq. (1), in which cooperation is not a Nash
equilibrium, to Eq. (8), in which cooperation becomes an ESS.
4.2 Robustness of theoretical predictions
All the above results are based on the replicator equation of the transformed matrix Eq. (5). Eq. (5) is
determined by the cost-to-benefit ratio, the intensities of self-recommendation and the probability to react
to the self-recommendation. However, the population size N , average degree 〈d〉, as well as the frequency
of the strategy updates ω are absent in the transformed matrix. Here we investigate the robustness of our
theoretical predictions with respect to these parameters via simulations.
6
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7
Stubbornness p
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
R
C/
R D
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
Figure 2: The final fraction of cooperators as a function of RC/RD and stubbornness p. It is shown that
cooperation prevails if the cooperators are more eloquent, i.e., RC/RD is sufficiently large; and if individuals
are open to accept the self-recommendation, i.e., p is small. The simulation, i.e., the heat map, is in agreement
with our theoretical prediction, i.e., the black line determined by Eq (7). (Parameters: Prisoner’s Dilemma
with b = 3 and c = 1, N = 1000, 〈d〉 = 20, ω = 10−3, k = 1, and β = 10. The initial fraction of cooperators
is 0.5.)
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Figure 3: The final fraction of cooperators as a function of RC/RD and cost-to-benefit ratio c/b. The heat
map represents the simulation result and the black line indicates the theoretical boundary predicted by
x∗ = cRD/[(b − c)(RC − RD)] = 0.5. We can see that the simulation is in agreement with our theoretical
prediction. It is shown that small cost-to-benefit ratio facilitates the cooperation. (Parameters: N = 1000,
〈d〉 = 20, ω = 10−3, k = 1, and β = 10. The initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5 and the stubbornness
p = 0.)
8
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
(a) (b) (c)
Fi
na
l f
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 c
oo
pe
ra
to
rs
Initial fraction of cooperators
N=60
N=80
N=100
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
Fi
na
l f
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 c
oo
pe
ra
to
rs
Initial fraction of cooperators
〈d〉=40
〈d〉=20
〈d〉=10
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
Fi
na
l f
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 c
oo
pe
ra
to
rs
Initial fraction of cooperators
w=0.001
w=0.01
w=0.05
Figure 4: Illustration of the robustness of our theoretical result. (a) The left panel shows the simulation
results for different population sizes. The critical transition from all defection to all cooperation is shifted
to the right with the decrease of N . (b) The middle panel shows the simulation results for different average
degrees. The case with smaller average degree shows more fluctuations than the one with larger average
degree. (c) The right panel shows that the simulation results are quite sensitive to the frequency of the
strategy updates ω. The critical transition is shifted to the right with the increase of ω. The default
parameters are the same as in Fig. 1.
Firstly, we find that the larger the population size is, the better the agreement is shown between simulation
results and theoretical prediction (Fig 4(a)). Noteworthy, our theoretical prediction is based on the mean-
field analysis assuming that the population size is large enough. Therefore, it is not surprised to see the
disagreement when the population size is small. Note that the critical value is shifted to the right with the
decrease of N (Fig 4(a)). Actually, given the average degree ( 〈d〉 = 20 in Fig 4(a)), smaller population
size corresponds to denser network structure, which could suppress the assortment of cooperators during the
network update.
Secondly, we investigate the average degree 〈d〉 (Fig 4(b)). We can see that the smaller 〈d〉 is, the
more fluctuated the simulation result is. In other words, the transition region from all defection to all
cooperation becomes less sharp as 〈d〉 decreases. This phenomenon seems a little bit counterintuitive because
our theoretical approximation is based on the assumption that the whole population size is much larger than
the average degree of the network. It means that, given the same population size, the case with smaller
average degree should better agree with the theoretical prediction. However, it should be noted that smaller
average degree increases the stochastic of the linking dynamics, because smaller 〈d〉 results in less number
of total links (L = N〈d〉/2) in the system. In this way, properly increasing the value of 〈d〉 can reduce the
fluctuations around the expected numbers of CC, CD and DD links in the stationary regime, making the
simulation results accord with our theoretical prediction better.
Finally, let us discuss the parameter ω, i.e. the frequency of the strategy updates (Fig 4(c)). We find
that the simulation results are sensitive to ω. In particular, the critical transition from all defectors to all
cooperators increases with the increase of ω. Noteworthy, our method assumes that the network update
is much faster than the strategy update (ω  1), it thus makes sense that the simulation with smaller
ω shows better agreement with our theoretical prediction. As ω becomes larger, the strategy will update
more frequently, and it is not long enough for the network to reach the stationary regime. Therefore, the
population structure reshaped by the self-recommendation would be of less benefit for cooperators to form
clusters, and then would inhibit the emergence of cooperation.
5 Conclusions and Discussions
Active information spreading is ubiquitous, ranging from commercial advertisement [20] to election campaign
[36]. Those with high intensities of self-recommendation are likely to convince others. It is similar to
reputation, where cooperators are typically assumed to have a high score of reputation [14, 27, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41]. Both self-recommendation and reputation play their role in the communication. Both cannot work unless
the observers recognize. However, they remarkably differ from each other. On the one hand, individuals take
the initiative to attract others when they recommend themselves. Those who self-recommend are active.
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Reputation is at work in a passive way. Individuals with high score of reputation could be too shy to be
recognized. On the other hand, the reputation is driven by a social norm, and it is an opinion of a population.
The self-recommendation is of personal ability which is up to the focal individual.
We find that eloquent cooperators are necessary to promote cooperation. The intuition is not straight-
forward, because an eloquent cooperator does not imply that cooperation is at an advantage: If the active
individual is a cooperator, an eloquent cooperator with high RC would be more likely to become the active
cooperator’s potential new neighbor. Once the new link is established, it benefits both the active cooperator
and the eloquent cooperator. If the active individual is a defector, however, an eloquent cooperator once
again would be more likely to connect with the active defector. This new link would only benefit the active
defector rather than the cooperator. In fact, the eloquent cooperators can form clusters, although they
occasionally attach to defectors. The clustered cooperators gain much more than their defector neighbors.
Thus the occasional attached defector would open an avenue for the cooperator cluster to spread. Even-
tually cooperation takes over the whole population [42]. Therefore, our results echo the so-called network
reciprocity that cooperators can prevail by forming cooperative clusters [2].
In addition, we find that the observers should be not too stubborn, and they should be open to the
self-recommendation. In particular, if the individual are 100% open to the self-recommendation, cooperation
becomes the stable Nash equilibrium, provided cb < 1 − RDRC . The larger RC is, the larger 1 − RDRC is, the
more likely it is to form a cooperative cluster. In other words, 1 − RDRC represent the social viscosity, which
is similar to [24, 25, 43].
To sum up, our results suggest that cooperators should be encouraged to be more active in communicating
with others, otherwise the defectors would mislead and drive the population to the tragedy of the commons
[44].
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A Markov linking dynamics and its stationary distribution
For the linking dynamics, there are three different types of social ties: cooperator-cooperator (CC), cooperator-
defector (CD) and defector-defector (DD) links. Based on the presented rewiring rule with self-recommendation,
the network updating process can be modeled as a discrete-time Markov chain in the state space of {CC,CD,DD}
[45, 46]. Let us denote xC and xD be the fraction of cooperators and defectors in the population.
We take the transition from CD to DD as an example. This transition happens only when a CD link
is broken off (with probability k) and the D individual is selected as the active individual (with probability
1/2), and then rewire to another defector (with probability xD if D does not respond or with probability αD
if it does respond). As a result, the transition probability is either k 12xD or k
1
2αD, depending on whether
or not the active individual responds to the self-recommendation by others. According to the Law of Total
Probability, the transition probability from CD to DD is given by pk 12xD+(1−p)k 12αD. All the rest entries
of the transition matrix M0 are obtained in the same argument.
We thus end up with the transition matrix
M0 = pM1 + (1− p)M2, (10)
where
M1 =
CC CD DD
CC
CD
DD
 1− kxD kxD 0kxC/2 1− (k/2) kxD/2
0 kxC 1− kxC
 , (11)
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and
M2 =
CC CD DD
CC
CD
DD
 1− kαD kαD 0kαC/2 1− (k/2) kαD/2
0 kαC 1− kαC
 (12)
with αC = xCRC/(xCRC + xDRD) and αD = xDRD/(xCRC + xDRD).
Actually,M1 andM2 are the transition probability matrices conditional on the response and non-response
cases respectively. M0 is the convex combination of them due to Law of Total Probability. The resulting
Markov chain is aperiodic and irreducible, provided xCxD 6= 0. And there is a unique stationary distribution.
By solving the linear equation ~pi0M0 = ~pi0, we obtain the stationary distribution ~pi0 which is given by
~pi0 = (pi01, pi02, pi03) = χ
−1(γ3γ4, γ1γ4, γ1γ2), (13)
where
γ1 = pkxD(xCRC + xDRD) + (1− p)kxDRD,
γ2 =
1
2
kxDp(xCRC + xDRD) +
1
2
(1− p)kxDRD,
γ3 =
1
2
kxCp(xCRC + xDRD) +
1
2
(1− p)kxCRC ,
γ4 = pkxC(xCRC + xDRD) + (1− p)kxCRC ,
(14)
and χ = (γ3γ4 + γ1γ4 + γ1γ2) is the normalization factor.
~pi0 characterizes the relative frequencies of different types of links when the network structure in the
stationary regime.
B Replicator-like equation of the cooperation dynamics
Normally it is quite challenging to analyze the entangled dynamics of strategy update and social relationship
adjustment [35]. Here we overcome this challenge by assuming that the network update is much faster than
the strategy update (ω  1). In this case, the network structure reaches its stationary regime before a
strategy update happens. This assumption facilitates us to obtain more tractable model approximation. In
light of this, the idea of time scale separation has been frequently used in a variety of complex dynamics
[24, 25, 28, 29, 47, 48, 49, 50].
Note that there are three types of social ties. Let NCC , NCD and NDD be the numbers of CC, CD and
DD links. In the stationary regime we have
NCC = Lpi01,
NCD = Lpi02,
NDD = Lpi03.
(15)
L = N〈d〉/2 is the total number of links, which remains unchanged during the network updates. ~pi0 =
(pi01, pi02, pi03) represents the stationary distribution given by Eq. (13). We then calculate the average payoffs
of cooperators and defectors respectively as follows
fC = (2(b− c)NCC − cNCD)/NxC
= (2(b− c)pi01 − cpi02)L/NxC (16)
and
fD = bNCD/NxD
= bLpi02/NxD
. (17)
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When the population size N is sufficiently large, the model with Fermi updating rule can be captured by
the following equation [16, 25]
x˙C = xC(1− xC) tanh(β(fC − fD)/2). (18)
Let
G0(xC) = (fC − fD)−1 tanh(β(fC − fD)/2), (19)
Eq. (18) can be rewritten as
x˙C = G0(xC)xC(1− xC)(fC − fD). (20)
Note that G0(xC) is positive, Eqs. (20) and (18) have the same fixed points and stability properties. In other
words, they are equivalent to each other in terms of evolutionary stability. Therefore, Eq. (20) captures the
evolution of cooperation in our model. Substituting Eqs. (16) (17) (13) and (14) into Eq. (20) leads to:
x˙C = Q(xC)xC(1− xC) [(RC −RD)((1− p)b− c)xC −RDc] , (21)
where
Q(xC) =
Lk2
Nχ
(p(xCRC + xDRD) + (1− p)RC) (22)
is a positive rescaling factor. Therefore, we simplify (21) as
x˙C = xC(1− xC) [(RC −RD)((1− p)b− c)xC −RDc] (23)
without changing its evolutionary stability.
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